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Abstract
Background—Although the Horn of Africa region has successfully eliminated endemic 
poliovirus circulation, it remains at risk for reintroduction. International partners assisted Kenya in 
identifying gaps in the polio surveillance and routine immunization programs, and provided 
recommendations for improved surveillance and routine immunization during the health system 
decentralization process.
Methods—Structured questionnaires collected information about acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) 
surveillance resources, training, data monitoring, and supervision at provincial, district, and health 
facility levels. The routine immunization program information collected included questions about 
vaccine and resource availability, cold chain, logistics, health-care services and access, outreach 
coverage data, microplanning, and management and monitoring of AFP surveillance.
Results—Although AFP surveillance met national performance standards, widespread 
deficiencies and limited resources were observed and reported at all levels. Deficiencies were 
related to provider knowledge, funding, training, and supervision, and were particularly evident at 
the health facility level.
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Conclusions—Gap analysis assists in maximizing resources and capacity building in countries 
where surveillance and routine immunization lag behind other health priorities. Limited resources 
for surveillance and routine immunization systems in the region indicate a risk for additional 
outbreaks of wild poliovirus and other vaccine-preventable illnesses. Monitoring and evaluation of 
program strengthening activities are needed.
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Indigenous wild poliovirus has been eliminated in 98% of endemic countries since 1988, 
with a decrease from 350 000 cases in 1988 to 223 confirmed cases in 2012 [1]. The success 
of polio eradication efforts has been dependent on increasing population immunity through 
routine immunization and supplementary immunization activities and by improving 
surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP). AFP surveillance systems are expected to 
annually identify ≥2 nonpolio AFP (NPAFP) cases per 100 000 population under 15 years of 
age to demonstrate that their systems are sensitive enough to detect paralytic polio cases [2].
All countries within the Horn of Africa region have successfully eliminated endemic 
poliovirus circulation, with Kenya successfully presenting in 2005 their complete country 
documentation outlining polio-free status. However, the region has remained at high risk for 
reintroduction and has had multiple outbreaks in recent years. An outbreak of 19 cases of 
wild poliovirus occurred in Turkana, Kenya, in 2009, and was followed by an outbreak of 22 
cases in Uganda in 2010. In 2011, another wild poliovirus case was detected in western 
Kenya and was found to be genetically related to the 2010 outbreak in Uganda. These 
outbreaks indicated missed circulation within the region over a 3-year period. As of 31 
December, 203 confirmed cases of WPV had been confirmed in the Horn of Africa in 2013. 
All of these outbreaks underscore the regional struggle to achieve the surveillance sensitivity 
and population immunity necessary to prevent transmission of imported poliovirus.
In the midst of these outbreaks, the health system in Kenya has been decentralized, with 
both increased administrative autonomy at the district level and an increase in number of 
districts. Following a risk analysis performed in January 2012, which showed that 121 of 
159 (77%) of districts in Kenya were at high or medium risk for a polio outbreak, the Kenya 
Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation (MoPHS) engaged the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and other international partners to assist in a review of the 
national surveillance and routine immunization systems. The purpose of the review was to 
identify gaps in the programs, as well as to provide recommendations toward improving 
detection of imported poliovirus and preventing poliovirus circulation during this period of 
health system decentralization [3].
METHODS
During 24–28 January 2012, 8 interview teams, consisting of personnel from MoPHS, 
WHO, CDC, and UNICEF, conducted a review of the national surveillance and routine 
immunization systems at the provincial, district, and health facility levels. At the national 
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level, the review was conducted at the Division of Vaccines and Immunizations (DVI), 
Division of Disease Surveillance and Response (DDSR), Kenya Medical Research Institute 
(KEMRI), and the MoPHS national vaccine stock depot. Among the 159 total districts in 
Kenya, 22 of the 121 high-or medium-risk districts identified in the 2012 risk analysis were 
selected for review; these districts represented 7 of 8 total provinces (Figure 1). Districts 
were selected based on multiple criteria, including: (1) geography, (2) security, (3) 
population immunity (eg, vaccine coverage), (3) surveillance indicators (eg, nonpolio AFP 
rate and stool specimen adequacy), (4) presence of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus, 
and (5) presence of high-risk populations. Two health facilities per district were selected for 
review based on the discretion of district personnel, as well as logistical considerations.
For data collection, standardized questionnaires were developed. The structured 
questionnaires collected information about AFP surveillance resources, training, data 
monitoring and supervision at all levels. Information on surveillance officer knowledge and 
documentation of AFP identification, reporting of AFP cases, and specimen collection were 
collected at the provider level. The routine immunization program information collected 
included questions about vaccine and resource availability, cold chain, logistics, healthcare 
services and access, outreach coverage data, microplanning, and overall management and 
monitoring of the system. Respondents were also asked to produce documentation to 
confirm the presence of guidelines, frequency of meetings, and other objective measures. 
Teams administered the questionnaires to a total of 70 key informants and documented 
observed cold chain and coverage charting.
RESULTS
National and Provincial Level
The national NPAFP rate of 3.1 per 100 000 population <15 years of age met WHO 
standards in 2011. However, national-level respondents reported that insufficient 
surveillance funding, related to insufficient allocation of funds for outbreak response, was 
contributing to deficiencies in training, supervision, active surveillance, specimen transport, 
communications, and meeting coordination. Further, an increase in the number of districts 
led to a dilution of trained healthcare and surveillance officers throughout the system; this 
challenge was compounded by high staff turnover and decreased accountability.
Training and Feedback—Kenya has transitioned from disease-specific surveillance to 
the regional Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system, with AFP 
surveillance now being supported by IDSR. The transition has necessitated new data 
collection forms and feedback processes. National-level staff reported concerns about the 
challenges in training all IDSR employees on AFP surveillance; missing and incomplete 
data collection forms were noted. The most recent formal AFP surveillance training was 
held in 2006, and no refresher training had been held in the previous 12 months. 
Additionally, there was no standardized protocol for the dissemination of laboratory results 
from AFP specimens back to the health centers that sent the specimens.
Coverage—In 2011, national coverage with the third dose of oral poliovirus vaccine 
(OPV3) was 88%, which did not meet the WHO target of 90%. Coverage and performance 
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reports were received at the district level from 95% of health facilities in the previous 12 
months, and 98% of districts provided feedback on these reports on schedule [4]. Outreach 
activities were not conducted as planned nationwide from 2009 to 2011, due to budget 
shortfalls at the national level; the national goal of 80% of facilities conducting outreach was 
not met. The national immunization program reported a major need for assistance in 
microplanning and estimation of target populations to ensure optimal coverage of the target 
population.
District and Health Facility Level
We visited 22 district offices and 41 health facilities in 7 provinces. Due to poor access and 
security concerns, we were unable to visit 3 health facilities from 2 districts in Eastern 
province.
Resources for AFP Surveillance—Insufficient financial resources for key elements of 
surveillance infrastructure, including active case searches and follow up, specimen 
transportation, and monitoring and supervision, were reported in 14 (64%) districts (Table 
1). Staff frequently cited using their own money for fuel, stool specimen delivery, and 
airtime for mobile telephones to complete surveillance tasks due to funding gaps or delays in 
reimbursements. Stool specimen collection kits for AFP surveillance were available in only 
13 (59%) districts, causing gaps in specimen collection or improvisation (eg, use of glass 
jars) at the facility level (Table 1). Improvisation reportedly caused inadequate specimens, 
poor temperature regulation in transit, and biosafety hazards at receipt.
Training for AFP Surveillance—Inadequately trained workforces deployed to the 
expanding number of districts and high staff turnover were repeatedly reported as problems 
by the districts and health facilities. Deficits in training were more pronounced at the health-
facility level where only 19 (46%) facilities had refresher trainings on surveillance within 
the previous 12 months (Table 2). Surveillance staff in only 5 (23%) districts knew their 
respective NPAFP rate (Table 1). Staff responsible for AFP surveillance in 8 (20%) facilities 
could not state the accurate case definition for acute flaccid paralysis (Table 2). Only 17 
(41%) facilities engaged the traditional healers and private practitioners in case notification 
activities (Table 2). Twenty-one (95%) districts had a copy of the technical surveillance 
guidelines, and 14 (64%) maintained an operational plan for surveillance (Table 1).
Supervision for AFP Surveillance—Twelve (55%) districts had completed planned 
supervisory visits to health facilities (Table 1). Health facilities in 7 (32%) districts had 
documentation of written supervisor feedback to ensure mitigation of identified deficiencies 
(Table 1). Among health facilities, 18 (44%) received the planned quarterly supportive 
supervision visits from the district in the past 12 months (Table 2). The most common 
reasons reported for not implementing planned supervisory visits were lack of funds for fuel, 
lack of transport, and staff shortages.
Data Monitoring for AFP Surveillance—Eight (36%) districts received timely and 
complete reporting from health facilities (Table 1). Staff in only 9 (41%) districts reported 
the number of AFP cases that matched the records in the national database. Thirteen (59%) 
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districts reported discussing surveillance in review meetings with health facilities. For health 
facilities, 22 (54%) reported discussing surveillance during supervisory visits from the 
districts (Table 2). Seventeen (77%) districts were able to present a recent feedback report 
for surveillance in their district (Table 1).
Planning for Routine Immunization—Only 13 (59%) districts had a map or table 
indicating which facilities in the district offered immunization (Table 1). Ten (25%) 
facilities had plans and maps for immunization outreach services. Only 9 (22%) health 
facilities had microplans for routine immunization, and only 1 (3%) reported reviewing 
microplans as an activity conducted by the district during supervisory visits (Table 2). Only 
14 (37%) of the 37 health facilities with responses reported having a current map of their 
catchment area, with only 6 (16%) identifying locations of outreach or mobile immunization 
sessions; lack of updated maps was reported in at least 1 facility in every province (Table 2).
Logistics and Cold Chain for Routine Immunization—Only 29% (12/41) of 
facilities had inventory logs that were consistent with their vaccine supply, and 17 (41%) 
facilities knew how to calculate a vaccine wastage rate (Table 2). Vaccine supply at the 
district level was affected by stock-outs in 18 (82%) districts and unreliable transportation in 
13 (59%) districts (Table 1). The length of stock-outs varied from 2 weeks to 3 months at 
the district level. Among the health facilities, 15 (37%) reported stock-outs of bacillus 
Calmette-Guérin (BCG); stock-outs of tetanus toxoid, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, oral 
poliovirus vaccine, and pentavalent vaccine were also mentioned (Table 2). In addition, 8 
(25%) facilities reported not having enough syringes, while 7 (17%) did not have sufficient 
diluents (Table 2). Stock-outs of sharps containers and vaccination cards were also reported.
Service Delivery of Routine Immunization—Among the 22 districts surveyed, 17 
(77%) reported that the majority of health facilities within the district offered immunization 
services (Table 1). Although up to 40% of the population may be seeking healthcare and 
routine vaccinations outside the public sector [5], only 9 (41%) districts maintained 
comprehensive lists of traditional healers or private practitioners in their catchment areas. 
Seventeen (77%) districts reported that some populations within their catchment area did not 
receive immunization services (Table 1). Eighteen (81%) districts had immunization service 
interruptions within the past 12 months (Table 1). Among 36 health facilities with responses, 
33 (92%) reported providing immunizations on a daily basis (Table 2). Among the 33 
facilities who provided immunizations daily, 28 (85%) reported providing all recommended 
vaccines (ie, measles and BCG) to infants presenting at their facility on any day and at any 
time (Table 2). While 26 of 39 (67%) facilities reportedly conducted outreach sessions, only 
10 held all planned outreach sessions (Table 2). Among the 41 health facilities, 8 (20%) 
reported registering newborns for immunization, 16 (39%) reported tracking defaulters, and 
22 (53%) reported performing social mobilization activities prior to sessions (Table 2). 
Vaccine stock-outs, hard-to-reach populations, and refusals based on religious beliefs were 
the main challenges cited for immunization service delivery.
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Data Monitoring for Routine Immunization—Among the 22 districts, 16 (73%) had 
vaccine coverage monitoring charts, but only 9 (41%) were up to date and accurate. Eight 
(36%) districts were able to calculate a dropout rate from their data (Table 1).
DISCUSSION
This evaluation of the AFP surveillance and routine immunization programs in Kenya in 
2012 highlighted gaps at the district-and health-facility levels within the context of a health 
system that rapidly decentralized after the elimination of endemic poliovirus. Deficiencies 
were reported and observed at multiple levels of the health system and were most commonly 
related to the challenges of funding, training, and supervision.
Shortcomings with surveillance and routine immunization activities were particularly 
evident at the local level. Although AFP surveillance met national performance standards, 
widespread deficiencies and the limited resources were observed and reported at subnational 
levels. This evaluation demonstrated inadequate financial and human resources for 
supervision, training, active surveillance, and specimen transport. The routine immunization 
program deficits included service interruptions, leading to gaps in vaccination coverage, 
vaccine shortages, lack of microplanning, inadequate use of vaccination data and monitoring 
tools for quality assurance, and lack of adequate staff training. Decentralization and a 
change from multiple surveillance systems to IDSR have the potential to improve the overall 
system. However, adequate funding and training are needed for optimal implementation [6, 
7].
The data collected during this evaluation led to recommendations to the national program to 
strengthen surveillance through trainings and prioritizing of hard-to-reach and migratory 
populations, use of short message service (SMS) reporting technologies, active surveillance 
at the community level, environmental surveillance, and strengthening partnerships with 
other health programs. Recommendations for routine immunization strengthening included 
establishing a process for routine immunization microplanning at district level, coordinating 
with other programs to integrate services and share data, engaging outside partners, 
prioritizing areas based on community risk and monitoring data, implementing vaccine 
forecasting at the facility level, monitoring vaccine distribution to prevent stock-outs, and 
creating a program to recognize high-achieving individuals or facilities. Recommendations 
were also made in the areas of financing, advocacy, and supplemental immunization 
campaign planning.
The Horn of Africa’s history of sustained transmission of wild poliovirus postimportation is 
indicative of gaps in the surveillance and routine immunization programs. The gaps 
identified in Kenya’s surveillance and routine immunization systems in 2012 forewarned 
partners of the risk of an impending regional wild poliovirus outbreak in these high-risk 
districts, which subsequently occurred in North Eastern province. Detection of surveillance 
gaps within the national program led to planning for systemic modifications and trainings to 
improve the suboptimal areas identified by the evaluation. Although these modifications had 
begun by the Horn of Africa Technical Advisory Group meeting in December 2012, they 
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were unable to prevent the 2013 importation-related outbreak, likely due to the long-term 
accumulation of susceptible populations during the post-elimination era.
The methods used to evaluate the Kenyan program may be applicable to other countries in 
the region looking to maximize resources and capacity building, especially in countries 
where prioritization of AFP surveillance and routine immunization have lagged behind other 
health priorities. Limited resources devoted to the surveillance and routine immunization 
systems in the region indicate a risk for additional outbreaks of wild poliovirus and other 
vaccine-preventable illnesses, as well as the need for monitoring and evaluation of program-
strengthening activities. Kenya traditionally serves as a leader in their region as the 
country’s health programs aim to identify and address modifiable risk factors for poliovirus 
importation and continued transmission.
This evaluation had several limitations. Because of the purposive sampling at all levels, 
findings are not meant to be generalizable beyond the sites visited. Recall bias may be 
present, as structured questionnaires required the recall of both routine and on-the-job duties 
as well as intermittent activities. The time-frame available for data collection activities 
limited the possible number of districts included and led to targeting of the 
nonrepresentative at-risk sample. Though these limitations make results of this activity 
specific to the areas where it was conducted, replication of these efforts can create a better 
understanding of the risks posed by wild poliovirus importation and the steps needed locally 
to avert transmission of imported poliovirus. Continued yearly risk analyses of surveillance 
and population factors at the district level should provide actionable data for advocacy, 
financial forecasting, and planning for needed program inputs.
Similar if not larger gaps in surveillance and routine immunizations exist in other countries 
in the Horn of Africa, which likely contributed to the ongoing polio outbreak. This 
evaluation highlights the importance of systematically assessing programs on a regular basis 
and the importance of continued vigilance toward AFP surveillance and routine 
immunization to prevent reintroduction of poliovirus to nonendemic regions such as the 
Horn of Africa. The expected timeframe for sustainable system strengthening in response to 
weaknesses at the local level is lengthy and requires human and financial resources, but it is 
a necessary step to achieving global polio eradication.
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Geographic areas of Kenya selected for the acute flaccid paralysis surveillance and 
Expanded Program on Immunization review, 2012.
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Table 1
Characteristics Regarding AFP Surveillance and Routine Immunizations Among Surveyed Districts, Kenya, 
2012
Indicator Districts (n) Districts Responding, % (n/22)
Insufficient financial resources for key surveillance elements 14 64
Calculated nonpolio AFP rate 5 23
Tracked number of nonpolio AFP cases 9 41
Surveillance feedback reports observed 17 77
Timely reporting 8 36
Conducted supervisory visits 10 45
Written documentation of supervisor feedback 7 32
Surveillance discussed at supervisory visits 13 59
Surveillance guidelines observed 21 95
Operational plan observed 14 64
Adequate number of specimen collection kits observed 13 59
Conducted immunization services 17 77
Population maps/tables for immunization planning observed 13 59
District contained populations not receiving immunization services 17 77
Vaccine interruptions at the national level 18 81
Monitoring chart observed 16 73
Monitoring chart was current 9 41
Calculated drop-out rate 8 36
Vaccine stock-outs at the district level 18 81
Unreliable transport 13 59
Total districts = 22.
Abbreviation: AFP, acute flaccid paralysis.
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Table 2
Characteristics Regarding AFP Surveillance and Routine Immunizations Among Surveyed Facilities, Kenya, 
2012
Indicator Facilities (n) Number of Facilities Responding (N) n/N (%)
Received quarterly supervisory visits in previous 12 mo 18 41 44
Conducted surveillance refresher trainings in last 12 mo 19 41 41
Conducted daily immunizations 33 36 92
Provided vaccine any time an eligible child presented at the facility 28 33 85
Routine immunization microplans observed 9 41 22
Routine immunization microplans reviewed on a schedule 1 36 3
Catchment area map observed 14 37 38
Conducted outreach sessions 26 39 67
Conducted all planned outreach sessions 10 39 26
Surveillance staff stated accurate AFP case definition 33 41 80
Surveillance discussed at supervisory visits 22 41 54
Registered new births 8 41 22
Tracked immunization defaulters 16 41 39
Conducted mobilization sessions for immunization 22 41 53
Inventory log was consistent with vaccine supply 12 41 29
Calculated wastage rate 17 41 41
BCG stock-outs occurred 15 41 37
Insufficient supply of syringes 8 32 25
Insufficient supply of diluent 7 41 17
Total health facilities = 41.
Abbreviations: AFP, acute flaccid paralysis; BCG, bacillus Calmette-Guérin.
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